The paper "Faster private set intersection based on OT extension" was a collaboration work between Benny Pinkas (BIU), Thomas Schneider (TUDA) and Michael Zohner (TUDA). We are happy to announce that this paper has been accepted for publication at 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security'14) in August 20-22, 2014 and we would like to provide you a short insight:
Private set intersection (PSI) allows two parties to compute the intersection of their sets without revealing any information about items that are not in the intersection. It is one of the best studied applications of secure computation and many PSI protocols have been proposed. However, the variety of existing PSI protocols makes it difficult to identify the solution that performs best in a respective scenario, especially since they were not all implemented and compared in the same setting. In this work, we give an overview on existing PSI protocols that are secure against semi-honest adversaries. We take advantage of the most recent efficiency improvements in OT extension to propose significant optimizations to previous PSI protocols and to suggest a new PSI protocol whose runtime is superior to that of existing protocols. We compare the performance of the protocols both theoretically and experimentally, by implementing all protocols on the same platform, and give recommendations on which protocol to use in a particular setting. http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/447